yolo-cage
AI coding agents that can't exfiltrate secrets
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I made this for myself, and it seemed like it might be useful to others. I'd love some feedback, both on the threat model and the tool itself. I hope you find it useful!Backstory: I've been using many agents in parallel as I work on a somewhat ambitious financial analysis tool. I was juggling agents working on epics for the linear solver, the persistence layer, the front-end, and planning for the second-generation solver. I was losing my mind playing whack-a-mole with the permission prompts. YOLO mode felt so tempting. And yet.Then it occurred to me: what if YOLO mode isn't so bad? Decision fatigue is a thing. If I could cap the blast radius of a confused agent, maybe I could just review once. Wouldn't that be safer?So that day, while my kids were taking a nap, I decided to see if I could put YOLO-mode Claude inside a sandbox that blocks exfiltration and regulates git access. The result is yolo-cage.Also: the AI wrote its own containment system from inside the system's own prototype. Which is either very aligned or very meta, depending on how you look at it.
HN · launched Jan 21, 2026 · 60 upvotes (top 16%) · 0 views
Niche: ai agent execution sandboxes · 141 launches, 8 in the last 7 days · Explore this niche →
Category and tags
- Security
- Dev tools
- Developer
- AI-native
- Hobby / open-source project
Visit website ↗ Source listing ↗
More like this: all 141 launches in ai agent execution sandboxes →
Could you build this?
No Preventing arbitrary AI coding agents from exfiltrating secrets requires deep security sandboxing, Linux kernel namespaces, seccomp filtering, and strict network/socket virtualization.
What it would actually take: A robust solution requires an isolated execution environment using microVMs (like Firecracker) or hard Linux containers configured with strict cgroups, user/network namespaces, and custom eBPF/seccomp syscall filtering. It must feature an egress-filtering proxy that performs deep packet inspection or TLS interception to prevent steganographic exfiltration and covert channels while preserving legitimate agent package installations.
Discussion
20 comments analyzed.
Competitors mentioned: cordum.io, docker-nixuser, vibebin, Claude Code CLI
Concerns raised: AI agents can hallucinate non-existent packages causing supply chain attacks, Build-time backdoor injection risk (weakened RNG, leaked keys, disabled SSL verification), Plaintext checks are not strong enough to prevent LLM violations of intent, AI-generated filters may not provide adequate protection if bypassed, Arbitrary command execution in production is higher risk than code changes
Feature requests: IDE integration support, Strict egress filtering via proxy for package fetching, Supervisor-mediated external access instead of direct agent connections, Network isolation rather than content-based filtering, Informative rejection messages explaining reasons for restrictions
Competitors
Other products that read as similar to this one : 751 launches clear the similarity bar, closest 8 shown.
Attention rank: #140 of 752 (itself plus its competitors, highest first, normalized so YC and Product Hunt are compared fairly).
Launched 83 days after the earliest competitor.
- RewardHackBench: Using sandboxes to stop agents from cheating · hn · 2026-06-17 · 9 upvotes · similarity 0.49
- Huzzah · hn · 2026-08-20 · 384 upvotes · similarity 0.48
- Git for AI Agents · hn · 2026-05-08 · 129 upvotes · similarity 0.48
- Git for AI Agents · hn · 2026-05-07 · 5 upvotes · similarity 0.48
- Computer Agents · hn · 2026-03-01 · 7 upvotes · similarity 0.47
- Era · hn · 2025-11-27 · 62 upvotes · similarity 0.47
- Agentspace · hn · 2026-06-17 · 5 upvotes · similarity 0.45
- grim-prompter · github · 2026-10-28 · 330 upvotes · similarity 0.45
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